AS AFFECTING TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY.

Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON gives also the following opinion we cannot adopt: it We have no more right to say that the brain feels at
the finger points, as consciousness assures us, than to assert that it
think8 exclusively in the brain." Let us examine this proposition:
When I know that I feel, I am aware it is not in my finger the
operation of knowing took place; there was a sensation which
must not be mistaken for a perception. Everybody knows a sensation does not generally determine its cause, but the perception
analyzes its conditions and leads to the conception. But supposing.
with Sir WILLIAM, that nerves are only elongated brains, although
it is quite in opposition with anatomy, what would be the advantage
of such opinion ? True, we are then at a loss to know where the
seat of intelligence may be, but it is not its seat that would give
us a light on the nature of insanity-whether purely spiritual or
exclusively material-and that is the important question. Now, the
somato-psychical theory confesses the unknown relationof soul and
matter in the human mind. Evidently, the material side of the
question has more chances of solution if we admit the presence of
the soul in the nervous centres and not in the extremities. There,
only, the soul necessarily objectivates itself as having acted in the
perception and sensation.
We finish this first part by acknowledging that if it had not
been for 'the elaborate and very clear essay of Mr. Wetmore
we would not have been able, for our'own benefit, to' disentangle
the -intricacy of laws and statutes on insanity, and especially to
know anything about their history. In a future communication
the more complicated cases of testamentary capacity, relative to
positive insanity, will be examined.
J. P.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
THE YORK COUNTY M. F. INS. CO. Vs. A. 0. BROOKS.
Where a surety to a bond signs upon the assurance that the principal will alsc pro.
cure two other persons, specified and known to such surety, to sign the bond
before he delivers the same, which he fails to do, but this is wholly unknown Lo

the obligee at the time he accepts the bond, such surety is bound to perform tie
obligation.

INSURANCE CO. vs. BROOKS.
Where the third surety upon a bond signs under the belief that the former signstures are genuine, but one of them is, in fact, forged by the principal in the
bond, who erases such forged signatuie before he delivers the same to the obligea,
who is wholly ignorant of these facts at the time, such surety cannot defend
against the obligation.

APPLETON, C. J.-The defendant, A. 0. Brooks, having been
employed by the plaintiffs, as their agent to collect their outstanding assessments, gave them the bond in suit as security for the
faithful performance of his trust. The plaintiffs received it ignorant of any agreement between him and the other defendants, or
of any relations between them other than those arising from their
respective signatures. Brooks having failed to pay over the
moneys collected, the plaintiffs seek to enforce the bond in suit for
the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the loss sustained.
John W. Perkins, the first surety on the bond, claims to be discharged because he "signed it on the promise of A. 0. Brooks,
that he would procure the signature of Robert G. Perkins," which
he failed-to do. The existence of this promise was unknown to
the plaintiffs, and it is no fault of theirs that it was broken. This
defendant neither signed the deed'on condition nor delivered it as
an escrow. He relied upon the promise of his principal, and he
is not the first surety and probably will not be the last, who has
found a reliance on such promises like leaning upon a broken
staff. He undoubtedly expected the promise to be performed,
but the. disappointment of his expectations constitutes no answer
to the plaintiffs' claim. When a bond is signed and delivered
without any condition or reservation annexed, although under an
expectation that it would be signed by others,.it is the deed of the
person signing, though it should not be signed by those whom he
expected to sign it: Haskinsvs. Lombard, 16 Maine 140. So, too,
where a note payable to a bank wa s signed by the.principal and
one surety, an agreement on the part of the principal with such
surety, that he will procure another surety, which is not done,
before he procures the note to be discounted, constitutes no defence
unless the officers of the b.nk were conusant of such agreement.:
The Paeaump8ie Bank vs. Go#, 81 Vermont 315 ; Dixon vs. Dion,
8 Vermont 450.
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It is admitted that the name of Robert G. Perkins, affixed to the
bond, was a forgery, and was erased therefrom before its delivery
to the plaintiffs, and that there was no appearance of his name on
the bond when delivered, nor that it had ever been there.
The other defendant, John Perkins, alleges that he - signed the
bond on the faith of the name of Robert G. Perkins, whom he
knew to be a man of property," but, as that was a forgery, he
denies his liability. But it was his neglect that he was ignorant
of the genuineness of the signatures which preceded his own. ,He
imposed no conditions limiting the legal. effect of his signature.
A surety on a bond cannot interpose as a defence against paying
for the defaults of his principal that the name of another surety
upon the same bond was obtained by fraud, unless the signature
of the latter was a condition by which to obtain that of the former:
Franklin Bank vs. &evens,' 39 Maine 538. Perkins made no
conditional signature, nor was there a conditional delivery. A
subsequent surety is not to be discharged because the name of a
prior one 'has been forged. His own signature is an implied
assertion on his part of the genineness of those preceding it, for it
is not to be presumed that a man -would affix his name to a bond
when the prior names were forged. It was held in Selser vs.
Brock, 3 Ohio 302, that one who signed a note, apparently as
principal, but who was, in fact, a surety within the knowledge of
the holder and affixed his signature after the names of others, as
signers had been forged upon the note, and while it was- in the
hands of him for whose benefit it was drawn, so far sanctioned and
Affirmed the genuineness of the signatures, that he could not take
advantage of the fraud in his defence against the holder, unless he
show the holder was privy to the same. 1 Parsons on Notes and
Bills 235.
The name of Robert G. Perkins was erased before the bond was
delivered to the plaintiffs. They never knew it had been fraudulently affixed, nor of its subsequent erasure. Such alterations
only as are material will defeat a bond. The forgery imposed no
liability on the. person whose name was forged. Its erasure
neither released nor discharged him from any. The surrender of,
VOL. XII.-26
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a fictitious and forged bond for the benefit of the surety, to whom
the same was of no possible use, except as a matter in terrorem,
affords no ground upon which a court of equity will decree the
exoneration of a surety: Loomi8 vs. Fay, 24 Vermont 240. The
defendants would have been liable had the erasure not been made.
The erasure has in no respect altered their rights nor affected
their liabilities. Their liability still continues.
Defendants defaulted.
We are indebted to the courtesy of
ChiefJustice APPLETON for the foregoing
opinion, and it seems-to us to embrace
some points of considerable practical
interest. We had occasion to advert to
the general subject, in, a brief note to
Seely vs. The People, 2 Law Reg. N. S.
844, 846. But the points presented in
the present case arise somewhat differently, and the decision of the court
here is not, perhaps, entirely in consonance with that of the court of Illinois,
in that case.
I. The first question made in this case
seems to us entirely one side of the
principle upon which it is attempted to
be placedby the defence. That one who
signs a bond, as surety, upon the assurance of his principal, that he shall also
have gtber responsible co-sureties which
are never procured, and the bond nevertheless delivered, is deceived and defrauded of his indemnity, no one can
qnestion. But whether he shall himself
bear the loss, or visit it upon the obligee,
is quite a different question. And it
seems to us, upon principle, that where
there is nothing upon the face of the
paper, indicating that other co-sureties
were expected to become parties to the
instrument, and no fact brought to the
knowledge of the obligee before he
accepts the instrument calculated to put
him on his guard in regard to that point,
and which would naturally have led a

prudent man, interested in the opposite
direction, to have made inquiry before
accepting .the security, the fault cannot
be said to rest, to any extent, upon the
obliges.
And, on the other hand, where the
surety intrusts the bond to theprincipal
obligor in perfect form, with his own
name attached as surety, and nothing
upon the paper tu indicate that any
others are expected' to sign the instrument in order to give it full validity
against all the parties, he makes such
principal his agent, to deliver the same
to the obligee, because such is the
natural and ordinary course of conducting such transactions.
And if the
principal, under such circumstances,
gives any assurances to the surety, in
regard to procuring other co-sureties, or
performing any other condition before
he delivers the bond, and which he fails
to perform, the surety giving confidence
to such assurances must stand the hazard
of their performance, and cannot implicate the 'obligee in any responsibility in
the matter, unless he is guilty of fraud
or rashness in accepting the security.
It seems to have been held in a
majority of the American cases, that, in
order- to put the obliges upon inquiry
even, some indication upou tne face of
the paper, such as the insertion of other
names in the body of the bond, or some
memorandum attached to the signature
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of the surety, indicating t]e condition of A. obtained certificates from a box of
opon which he signed, should exist, orl A.'s, necessary to perfect the transferselse some notice in inyais to the obligee, and he also forged the names of the
which might fairly be regarded as attesting witnesses. In an action against
equivalent. And that without this the the company for damages, and for a
obligee is not chargeable with any posi- mandamus to restore the plaintiff's name
tive default; and if there has been to the register, it was held that theacts of
default on the part of the obliger, the the plaintiff were not such as estopped
bond may be enforced.
him from showing that the deed of transIL But the great difficulty arises fer was a forgery.
upon the correlative question in the
It must be conceded that many of the
case, that is. how far the sureties have American cases, in attempting to follow
been guilty of any such want of care and out the principle of the case of Lickbarprudence in the manner of giving their row w. Mason, 2 T. R. 70, that whenever
signatures as to estop them from show- one of two innocent persons must suffer
ing that the bond, as to them, was an by the act of a third person, he who has
incomplete instrument, and, in fact, enabled such person to occasion the loss.
delivered, as far as there was any must sustain it, have held many parties
delivery, merely as an escrow. For if estopped from showing the true state ofk
there has been no legal fault on the part the facts in their defence, upon much
of the obligor, the bond certainly cannot slighter grounds than the late English
be enforced against them. And it must cases require. The principle of these
be confessed that the recent English American cases is fairly brought to view
decisions, and especially that of Swan vs. by the manner of putting the case by
The North British Australasian Compa- KEATING, J., in his dissent from the
ny, 10 Jur. N. S. 102 (1864), in the other judges, that one who, by his culExchequer Chamber, bear very much in pably negligent act, enables his agent to
favor of the sureties in this bond. This commit a fraud to the prejudice of third
case was tried before the Court of Ex- persons, by fabricating a transfer of the
chequer, 8 Jur. N. S. 940 ; and the same shares in question, is justly estopped
question was also tried before the Com- from defeating the effect of such transmon Pleas, 7 C. B. N. S. 400, and fer by showing thatit was made contrary
finally, after very careful and patient to his expectations.
examination, decided in the Exchequer
This view of the question will unChamber, before the Lord Chief Justice questionably sustain the decision in the
CocK uRN, and six of the pusine judges, principal case. But when it is conall, except KEATING, J., concurring in sidered, on the other hand, that this
the decision.
whole ground has been so thoroughly
It was here held that where A. was reviewed by two of the superior courts
induced by his broker to send him blank in Westminster Hall, and in the Excheforms of transfer, which the broker filled quer Chamber also, and so very reup with numbers and descriptions of cently, and with the same result, in all
shares different from those of the com- the other courts, it cannot fail to raise
pany intended by A., being shares in grave doubts in the miids of the Amerithe defendant's company, and by means can courts, who have followed the opof a duplicate key, which he had pro- posite view, whether there be not some
cured to be made without the knowledge fallacy in the extent to whioh, they,are
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pushing the doctrine of estoppels in pais
upon the mere ground of negligent
omission. The English courts are, of
late, certainly requiring something more
than mere omission and negligence to
create an estoppel inpais. It must be
conduct amounting to an implied license,
or else it must be wilful and fraudulent:
Patchin vs. Dubbins, Kay 1.
We confess to a strong inclination,
in questions affecting specialties and
simple contracts not negotiable, to
favor the English rule. It seems to us
that too many of the American cases,
in striving to require good faith and
diligence of the obligor or promissor,
have quite too much overlooked the
arresponding obligations on the part of

the obligee. We can see no good reason
why the obligee, who, in accepting the
bond, trusts to the representations of
the principal obligor as to the exection of the instrument by the others,
who are known to stand as mere sure.
ties, should be any more entitled to
screen himself from the consequences of
those representations proving false, than
should the obligor. The true rule in
such case seems to be that each party
may stand upon the facts of Ike case,
unless he has been guilty of fraudulent
misconduct. This is certainly the present English rule upon the subject, and
the one which we believe will ultimately
prevail in this country.
L F. R.

Now York Court of Appeal.
ELISHA B. MORRELL VS. THE IRVING FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY.
.'A building was insured against fire to the amount of $3000 by A., and to the
amount of $2000 by B., in separate policies, each of which contained the following clause: "In case of loss or damage to the property insured, it shall be
optional with the company to replace the article lost or damaged with others of
the same kind or quality, and to rebuild or repair the building or buildings
within a reasonable time, giving notice of their intention to do so within twenty
days after having received the pieliminary proofs of loss," &c.
The building having been destroyed by fire, A. and B. served-a joint notice upon the
insured, that they were prepared to rebuild, and requested plans and specifications, which were furnished accordingly. The building having been reconstructed, the insured insisted that the contract to rebuild had not been substantially complied with, and brought an action on the policy against A., claiming to recover the full amount of his original loss: Held, that he could not
recover.
After the election and notice, a contract to rebuild existed between the parties, of
such a kind that. the contractor had received the entire consideration in advance. If this contract is not fulfilled by the insurer, he is liable for the damages sustained by the non-fulfilment of the contract, which may be more or less
than the amount insured. The action, consequently, should have been brought
to recover damages for breach of contract.
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Irt
8eems that the action might have been brought against both insurers jointly or
either separately.

The defendant insured the plaintiff against loss or damage by
fire, to the amount of $8000, on a certain three story brick building in the city of Brooklyn, for one year from"March 20th 1856.
The policy contained a condition that " in case of loss or damage
to the property insured, it shall be optional with the company to
replace the article lost or damaged, with others of the same kind
and quality, and to rebuild or repair the building or -buildinga
within, a reasonable time, giving notice of their intention to do so,.
within twenty days after having received the preliminary proofs
of loss required by the 9th article of these conditions."
The building was destroyed by fire January 6th 1857. The
actign was upon the policy to recover the $300.0 and interest.
The plaintiff made the proof necessary to entitle him to recover.
The defendant then read in evidence a policy of insurance upon
the same building made by the Excelsior Fire Insurance Conipauy
for $2000, containing the lik6econdition. The plaintiff alsa puf in,
evidence a joint notice of both' companies to the plaintiff, dated.
January 27th 1857, that they were prepared to'rebuild the said
building, and'requested the plaintiff to furnish them'with'the plans
and specifications, of the same. The defendant then gave evidence
tending to show that plans were furnished by the plaintiff to a
builder employed by the companies; that the work of'rebuilding
was commenced in February, and was completed within a reasonable time, according to the plans furnished, and thit the building
w as: thereupon occupied by the plaintiff. The plaintiff gave evidence tending to prove that plans and specifications were furnisbed,
and that the building was not properly constructed according to
the plans and specifications, and that there had not been a substantial compliance with the stipulation to rebuild. The defendant
gave further evidence upon this question tending to prove full performance of the work.. It should be stated that the defendant,
2
after putting in their evidence in chief, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, that the action should have been brought
upon the condition or covenant to rebuild, and nof upon the policy.
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The motion was denied, and the defendant excepted. At the clbs,
of the evidence the motion was renewed on the ground that it was
shown that'the two companies elected to rebuild, and made a joint
contract to rebuild, and did jointly rebuild, and therefore the suit
should be jointly against both companies. This motion was denied.
and the defendant excepted. The court, after stating the case and
some facts not in dispute, stated that the company undertook to,
-rebuild and did construct a building upon the same lot, and that
the question is whether they have substantially complied with the
condition of the policy touching the rebuilding.. That it was
the right of the parties to the contract to change it in regard
to the form of the structure and the material of which it was
composed. And if the company have put up such a structure
as Morrell required, it is a sufficient performance of the condition, and the plaintiff cannot recover.
"To make out the defence, the jury must be satisfied from the
&vidence that the new building, in respect to form, material, and
goodness of workmanship, is substantially like the building
destroyed, as the same were described in the plans and information given to the company by Morrell." "cThat if the jury are
of the opinion that the company have failed to fulfil the condition
and reconstruct the building in the manner which I have before
specified, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount of the
loss, without reference to the value of the building whiich the company have put upon the premises."
The counsel for the defendant excepted in the language of the
case: ,,lst. To so much of the charge as submitted to the jury
the question in this case whether the defendants rebuilt as the
ouilding was before the fire. 2d. As to the measure of damages
submitted." There were some requests to charge, some of which
were complied with, and others not, and, as to some, the court
refused to charge otherwise than as it had already charged.
The verdict was for the plaintiff $3315. Judgment was entered
upon the verdict, and upon appeal to the general term it was
affirmed, and thereupon the defendant appealed to this court.
if. N. Gilbert,for the plaintiff.
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R. Fitch, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-This is a new- case to which we are to apply, after
ascertaining the contract between the parties, principles of law
well settled.
It is well-settled law in this state that- he who undertakes to
build a house for another, or to perform any work, to be paid for
when the house is completed, or the other work done, cannot
recover any portion of the stipulated price or value of the work
until he has substantially performed the contract on. his part:
Smith vs. Brady,17 N. Y. R. 173, and cases therein cited.' Itis
also well-settled law that when one.contracts with another to build
for, him a house, or do other work, and agrees to pay.portions of
the consideration in instalments as the work progresses, and does
so pay, or pays the whole consideration in advance of the performance of the work, he can maintain no action for money had and
received, though the contract has been broken and remains unperformed unless the contract has been wholly rescinded. His
action must be upon the contract, and his damages must be for the
breach or breaches of the contract. The amount of damages 'will
not depend upon the amount of money he had paid, but the
damages will be the amount of loss sustained by a failure to perform the contract. In other words, what it will cost to procure a
full completion of the contract, including, if the case calls for it,
any special loss by reason of delays, &c. In the present case the
first of the above principles has been applied, and the defendant
has been placed in the position of one who has contracted to construbt a building in a certain manner, and for which he is to be
paid after the work is done, and who claims that he has performed
the contract, and seeks, by action, to recover the consideration,
and is met with the issue that he had not performed the condition
precelent, upon the performance of which his right of action depends.
This issue being decided against the defendant, it is held that he
is to have nothing on account of the house actually built, but is tc
pay to the plaintiff the entire sum specified in the policy as
indemnity to the plaintiff for the loss of his building.
MARVIN,
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I am not satisfied that this rule should be applied to the case.
It is important to determine, with some precision, what the case
"s-what the contract was between the parties. It is iaid that th6
contract was, on the part of the defendant, that in consideration
of a sum presently paid, it would indemnify (the contract is insure)
the plaintiff to the amount of $3000 for any loss he should sustain*
by fire on a certain building; and the defendant promised and
agreed to make good to the plaintiff, &c., all such loss or damage
not exceeding in amount the sum insured, as shall happen by fire
to the property- specified. But this was not the entire contract.
One of its terms and conditions was that in case of any loss or
damage to the property insured, it should be optional with the
company to rebuild or repair the building within a. reasonable time,
giving notice to do so within twenty days after receiving the preliminary proofs of loss. What construction should be given tathis
provision? What relation was established by it between the
parties ? The agreement is not exactly that the defendant shall
do one of two things, one of which being performed satisfied the
contract. There is no absolute contract that the defendant, upon
the happening of a certain event, should pay a sum of money or
rebuild the house. But the agreement was that the defendant
should pay an amount of money equal to the loss, not exceeding
$3000. Call it an indemnity for the loss, and the question will not
be changed, for the company might within twenty days ifter proof of
the loss, elect or decide to rebuild the building, and give notice of such
election or decision. In other words, the defendant had the right
by the contract to elect to rebuild, and in that way indemnify the
plaintiff by rebuilding. When the election to rebuild was made
and notified to the plaintiff, what was .the relation between the
parties ? The building had been destroyed by fire. The amount
of the loss may or it may not have been known. There may have
been dispute between the parties touching the amount of the less.
The insured could only claim $3000, though the loss may ht.vc
been greater. He could only recover his actual loss as an indem.
nity, but the actual amount of the loss may have been, and often
is, a matter of dispute and difficulty requiring a lawsuit to settle
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it. The insured may claim a much greater sum than the insurer
is willing to pay, and for the purpose of avoiding the difficulties
and litigation likely to arrive from such disputes, the insurer
secures, by the contract, a right to indemnify the insured by rebuilding the destroyed building instead of paying money, the amount
of which is uncertain, and the insured agrees to accept indemnity
in this way in lieu of any amount of money. All necessity for
ascertaining the amount of the loss ceases when the insurer undertakes the restoration .of the property. It seems to me that when
the insurer elects to rebuild, and gives notice of such election,
the centract at once is that the insurer will rebuild absolutely in
consideration of the premises, and the defendants agreement is
that the insurer may do so, in satisfaction of the demand, uncertain
in amount, which he claims of the insurer6 This becomes the
absolute agreement between the parties, by virtue of the agreement originally made, and which, prior to the election, was subject
to certain contingencies, terms, and conditions ; and it seems"to
me that after such election and notice, the relation between the
parties is simply that of a contractor to build, who had received
the entire consideration in advance, and a party for whom the
building is to be erected and who has made full payment, therefore, in advance of the work. Such, I think, is the fair construction of the contract. This provision was intended to obviate difficulties, some of which have been suggested. In this view ino action
could be maintained for the purpose of recovering the $80.00, or
such portion of it as should be equivalent to the loss. There can
be no inquiry as to the amount of the loss. The action willobe
upon the contract to rebuild, and the amount of the damages to be
recovered upon a breach of the contract, will be determined as in
other actions for the breach of building contracts, and such amount
may exceed the $3000.' The defendant agreed that it would build
the house, and it has been paid for its agreement and must per
form the agreement or pay the damages.
The peculiar language used in this pidvision has not escaped
attention. " It shall be optional with the insurance company to
replace and to rebuild," the insurance company "giving n otice Df
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their intention to do so." It may be said that the language is rot
sufficient to make a present contract to rebuild after the election
and notice. That although the defendant had the optional right to
rebuild and elected to rebuild, and gave notice of intention to do
so, still it was not bound to go on and build, but it might stop and
leave the insured to his remedy for a moneyed indemnity. This is
not, in my opinion, the fair construction of the provision, nor was
such the intention of the parties to the contract. The option
was with the defendant, and it was to give notice of its election.
The language as to the notice may not have been very happily
chosen in using the word - intention" instead of the words election,
option, or choke; but there can be no difficulty about the meaning. The right to rebuild, and the obligation to rebuild, depended
upon an election to rebuild, and the notice was simply to inforin
the other party that such election had been made. The parties so
understood the language. The notice actually given in this case
said nothing about intention. Its language is: " We hereby give
you notice that we are prepared to rebuild said building," and
this was treated as sufficient, and both parties acted upon it. It
seems to me very clear that, after the election and notice, there
existed a contract between the parties for the rebuilding of the
building destroyed, and the contract to make good in money the
loss no longer existed between the parties. If I am. right in the
view taken of the contract, the position that the contract for
indemnity in money remained in force until the house was actually
rebuilt, must fail. This position would seem to regard the provision
as an accord not valid as a satisfaction until executed, whereas I
regard it as a part of the original agreement by which this provision
might, upon the happening of a certain contingency, be substituted by
the election of one of the parties for and in the place of the provision
to indemnify in money, and it is the agreement of both parties, and
both are bound by it. It is, I submit, an error to suppose that this
was a conditional agreement by which, when performed, the previous
agreement to pay in money was satisfied, and if not performed,
then such money agreement remained in force. I have read carefully the dissenting opinion of Justice EMOTT in the court below;
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and though I am not able to concur fully in his construction of
the contract, I have no difficulty in adopting his argument against
the rule of damages enunciated at the circuit.
Assuming that the agreement to indemnify in money was not
entirely superseded by the agreement to rebuild, what would the
rights of the parties be upon a failure or partial failure to rebuild ?
The defendant had the right to satisfy the claim for the loss by
rebuilding. Suppose the loss to have been 83000, and the insurer
expends $2000 judiciously and profitably towards the rebuilding
of the house, and then stops, and the insured takes up the work
and completes the house by expending $1000? Has not this
claim for damages been partially satisfied ? I certainly think so;
and this is the position of Justice EMOTT. He applies to the case
the same principles applicable to an action against a contractor for a
breach of the contract to build, and refuses to apply the strict rule
against a contractor who seeks to recover the price, and "ismet with
the objection that the work has not been completed according to
the contract. But the learned justice limits the the recovery to a
sum not exceeding the amount that would have produced indemnity
had the agreement to rebuild never existed, and in this we differ.
It seems to me that this rule will be very difficult in practice.
The indemnity in- money can never exceed the amount of the risk
specified in the policy. Suppose the risk taken to be $8000, and
the insurer elects to rebuild and actually expends, necessarily and
properly, $3000, and the building is not completed, may be stop and
leave the building to be completed by the insured at, say, the cost of
an additional $1000 ? This must be so if the insured in such case is
anly entitled to an indemnity, measured by the sum of money
specified in the policy; 'for the $3000, having been judiciously
expended, is worth so much to him. The learned justice, however, lays down the rule, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
such an amount not exceeding the amount of the insurance as will
be necessary to make the building erected equal in all respects,
and similar to the one burned. The result of this rule would be,
in the case above supposed, that the plaintiff could recover the
additional $1000 expended by him though the defendant had ex.
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pended already the full amount insured, and this is precisely what
I claim. But suppose the insurer expends $1000, and it costs
$3000 to complete the building, the insured, by the rule laid down,
will recover $3000. Will he not in such a case realize for indem
nity $4000 ? Certainly he will. Or suppose the insurer expends
$2000, and the insured $3000, to complete the building, the latter
will recover the $3000 and thus realize $5000. He is to recover
such an amount as will be necessary to complete the building, not,
however, exceeding the amount of the insurance. Under such a
rule, an insurer who has elected to rebuild, and has performed a
part of the work and discovers that he has a hard bargain andcannot complete the work for the amount of the insurance, will at'
once abandon the work or may do so, being liable only for the pay-.
ment of the amount insured. Under such a rule the amount of
the loss will always come up for litigation and adjustment, and, as
I understand, the principal object of the provision we are considerihg, is to permit the insurer to obviate all disputes and litigation
touching the amount of the loss by replacing the articles lost or
damaged, or by repairing and rebuilding the building destroyed.
By adopting the construction for which I contend, we have a
simple rule which excludes any inquiry as to the amount of the loss,
and the inquiry will be, has the insured replaced the articles or
rebuilt the building in the manner agreed, and if not, the damages
will be as in other cases of the breach, by the builder,'of his agreement to build.
It is supposed that, in a case like the present, difficulties exist
touching parties to the action. I think that the supposed difficulties will disappear upon a brief examination of the law applicable
to such cases. The plaintiff held two policies upon the same
building, one issued by the defendant, taking a risk of $3000, the
other issued by the Excelsior Fire Insurance Company, taking a
risk of $2000. Each policy contained the same provisions or condition touching the optional right to rebuild. In this case both of
the companies elected to rebuild, and they united in one notice
that they were prepared to rebuild. The case does not contain,
as it should, the policies. But they were, of course, both valid,
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and, in contemplation of law, constituted one policy, so far as the
amount of loss was concerned. That is to say, the insured could
not recover the amount of his loss of each insurer supposing it had
been less than the smallest risk. All he is entitled to from all
the insurers is one indemnity. If he recovers this of one of the
insurers, such insurer may recover of the other, by way of contribution, his proper proportion. It is very common in this country
to provide in fire policies, that in case of two or more insurances
upon the same property, each insurer shall be liable only for a
rateable proportion of the loss. See Par. Mer. L. 516, 517.
Whether it was provided in the present case that each company
should only be liable for its rateable proportion of the loss does
not appear, but I think this will be seen not to be material.
Though the *plaintiff could not have maintained a joint action
against the companies upon these policies if there had been no
election to rebuild, but could have maintained separate actions.
recovering from the defendant three-fifths of the loss not exceeding $3000, and from the other company two-fifths not exceeding
$2000, it does not follow that, upon an election by both companies
to rebuild, he could not maintain a joint action against both upon
the agreement to rebuild, I think he could maintain such action,
and that the action in this case should properly have been against
both companies. When they jointly elected to rebuild, they jointly
agreed to rebuild, and were jointly liable in an action for a breach
of their agreement. I have no doubt the action would have been
well brought against both companies. They would not be permitted to allege that they had not jointly contracted with the
plaintiff. I am not prepared to say that the action was not well
brought against the defendant alone. I think the plaintiff might
well treat the election to rebuild as the election of each insurer,
and for a breach of the building agreement maintain his action
against either company, and recover full damages, or perhaps a
separate action against each for full damages, collecting the damages, however, but once. I think these positions follow from the
legal relations and rights of all the parties. The two companies
were bound to pay the loss rateably if so stipulated in the policies,
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and if not so stipulated, the whole loss should be paid by one, then
the other would be liable for contribution. When one of the
companies should elect to rebuild it would come under obligation
to the insured to make full indemnity by rebuilding; and if there
were a provision in the policy that it should only be liable to pay a
rateable proportion of the loss, such provision would be superseded
by the agreement to rebuild. If only one of the insurers should
elect to rebuild and should perform the building contract, it would
be entitled to contribution from the other company, not a proportion of the amount expended in building, but a rateable proportion in money of the actual loss. So also if the party undertaking
to rebuild should fail to perform the contract, and the insured
should recover and collect damages for the breach of the agreement, such party could recover of the other insurer a rateable pio.
portion of the loss. Such insurer would, by the payment of the
damages recovered by the insured, have satisfied the demand for
the loss. The insured would be fully indemnified, and the insurer
who paid nothing and did nothing would be liable for contribution.
In my opinion, the insured, in a case like the present, may have
his action against both insurers jointly, or against either separately,
and recover his full damages for the breach of the building contract, and leave the two insurers to an adjustment of their rights
between themselves according to well-settled rules of law applicable
to different insurers of the same property. The judgment should
be reversed, and there should be a new trial.
DENIO, C. J., read an opinion to the same effect. DAVIES,
SELDEN and
ROSEKRANS, and BALCOM, Js., concurred.

WRIGHT,

EMoT, Js., dissented.
L The principle underlying the main
proposition in this case is laid down in
Coke upon Littleton, 146 A.: .Elctio
semelfacta, etplacitum testatum nonpatitur
regresum. Quod srel placuit in electionibus amplius displiceretnonpotnte; or, as an
English judge translates it, the parties
have made their election and cannot now
change their mind. When an insurance
company elects to rebuild, and gives a

proper notice to that effect, it is bound
to rebuild, and cannot abandon the contract, although its fulfillment may
become difficult or even impossible. If
it is bound to rebuild, it may insist upon
its right to complete the contract. This
point was much discussed in Brown
vs. Insurance Society, 5 London Jurist
N. S. 1255; s. c. 8 Am. Law Register
285. The facts in that case were that
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the insurers had elected to rebuild, and
the public authorities caused the building to be taken down as a structure in
a dangerous condition. This condition
was not caused by the fire, and if the
interference of the authorities had not
taken place, the defendants would have
restored the premises to the condition
they were in before the fire. These
facts constituted no defence. Lord
CAMPBELM'S opinion is especially clear:
--The defendants undertook what was
lawful to be done, and whether it can be
done in point of fact is immaterial
They must do it or pay damages. They
are in the same situation as if the policy
had been absolute to reinstate the insured premises in case of fire. When an
election is given by a contract, and the
election is made, it is the same as if
there had been no election, and the party
making the election is absolutely bound
to do that which he has elected to do.
* * * The company undertook to do
that which was lawful, and what continues to be lawful, and whether it can
be done or not seems to me to be quite
immaterial; they must either do that
which they have undertaken to do, or
pay damages for not doing it." The
case was thought to be governed by
such authorities as Paradine vs. Jane,
Aleyn. R. 27 ; Hadley vs. Clark, 8 Term
R. 267; Hall vs. Wright, 5 Jur. N. S.
62; s. c., in Exchequer Chamber, 1
Ellis, Black. & Ellis 746. Similar cases
In this country are Harmony vs. Bingham, 2 Kern. 99; Adams vs. Nichols,
19 Pick. 275; School District vs. Dauchy,
25 Conn. 530; Trustees of Trenton vs.
Bennett, 3 Dutcher 514; Tompkins vs.,
Dudley, 25 N. Y. (11 Smith) 272.
It may well be that such a result may
not have been anticipated by the insurance company. Its object in causing the
elective clause to be inserted in the
policy may have been to hold a check

upon an extravagant claim for loss.
Nevertheless, if it once elects to rebuild,
it runs the risk of any rise of price of
materials, or of any extraordinary and
unexpected difficulty in fulfilling the
contract. It must rebuild or pay damages. The ordinary rules governing
insurance are dispensed with, and the
case is governed by principles applicable
to contracts in general.
We have thus far assumed that the
insurance was entered into by a company of which the insured is not a member. In the case of mutual insurance
companies, the question will be complicated by the fact that the insurance still
continues. Where the company is~not
mutual, and the premises are destroyed.
as soon as the house is rebuilt the con
tract is fully performed. The old policy
will not cover the new building. There
is no aliment upon which the original
policy can feed. But in mutual companies the insured still remains a member of the company, though his property.
is destroyed and rebuilt by the insurers.
He is liable for assessments during the
whole term of the policy. N. H.
Mutual Fire Insurance Company vs.
Rand, 4 Foster 428; Swamscot Machine
Company vs. Partridge, 5 Id. 369.
Under such circumstances, if the insurers rebuild at a cost less than the
amount of insurance, they are insurers
of the new building for the difference;
and if it is damaged by fire, an amount
can be recovered not exceeding such
difference: Trull vs. Roxbury Mutual
Fire Insurance Company, 3 Cush. 263.
In this case the insurers insured the
plaintiff $2000 on two buildings ($1000
on each) for seven years, with a right to
rebuild. The buildings were destroyed
by fire, and the insurers replaced the
one for $800, and the other for $65C.
The new buildings were destioyed by
fire within the term, and the insured
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was allowed to recover on the original
policy the sum of $550, being the difference between the sums insured and the
sums paid for former losses. The
reasoning of the court proceeds upon
the,peculiar relation between a mutual
fire insurance company and a party
insured by it.
II. The case seems very clear when
the contract is between the insured and
a single insurer. Complicated questions
present themselves where there is a
number of separate insurers. These
separate insurances cannot be regarded
as a single contract, but only as a series
of contracts. True, the law may impose upon such insurers certain mutual
obligations growing out of suretyship,
such as contribution, &c., but all these are
implications from the oriyinal contract.
If any of such insurers should elect to
rebuild and thus make a new contract
binding on itself, it cannot affect any
other insurance company which does not
choose to rebuild. It is a grave question whether the insurer electing to
rebuild would not lose all right of contribution from the other insurers on the
ground that they were liable only on
the original engagement and would be
discharged when the substituted agreement. had taken its place. However
that may be, it seems entirely clear that
no special liability could grow out of the
substituted contract as against the insurers who do not elect to rebuild.
Thus if A. is insured by B. and C. separately, and B., after a loss, elects to
rebuild and incurs extraordinary expense from the unexpected rise of
materials or labor, he cannot charge any
portion of this expense upon B., for his
contract only binds him to indemnify A.
against loss in the ordinary manner.
Suppose, however, that B. and C. should
each elect to rebuild, and should give the
proper notice to that effect, it does not

seem to us that there is in that case any
privity or mutual relationship between
them. The election, as we have seen,
forms a substituted contract, the effect
of which is quite different and distinct
from the ordinary contract of insurance.
It is not unlike the case where an owner
of land has paid each of two contractors
the entire price for building a house on
his estate, or where a person has paid
each of two mechanics the price for repairing a chattel.
He can compel
either one to perform his contract, and
the one performing has no action against
the other, for there is no privity of any
kind between them. He has simply
done what ge agreed to do by a separate
and independent engagement. So in
the case of the insurers who have elected
to rebuild, the notion of indemnity is laid
aside, and they are under special and
distinct engagements to fulfil an ordinary builder's contract. We do not see
how such persons could be sued in one
action, and doubt the soundness of the
dictum of MARVIN. J., in the principal
case to that effect. . This dictum appears
to be inconsistent with the general course
of his reasoning, in which we entirely
concur. He says with correctness that
the right to rebuild, anti the contract to
rebuild, grow out of the original agreement to insure. As the original agreement to insure is separate and distinct
by each insurer, we do not see how any
substituted agreement growing out of
two distinct agreements can be joint.
The substituted agreement must, as a
matter of course, be of the same nature
as the original contract. When that
point is directly presented for adjudication, we cannot doubt that it will be
held that each insurer must be sued
separately on the substituted contract,
because his original contract is single.
To sum up briefly our ideas on this
subject. An ordinary insurance policy
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Is an agreement to indemnify against
loss existing when property is destroyed,
eikher -.artiay or totally, by a peril embraced within the terms of the policy.
No subsequent rise in the value of the
property will produce any effect upon
the insurer's liability, nor would the
insurer be liable for any subsequent loss
occasioned by a cause not within the
policy. On the other hand, an agreement to rebbild is not an insurance
against a lo existing when the peril occurred. It is an agreement to reinstate
the property. It may serve to protect
the insured against future losses not
within the policy, so that if a building
partly destroyed by fire is taken down
by the public authorities, the insurers
must still rebuild. So if a building
partly destroyed by fire, was afterwards
fully destroyed by the act of God, as by
a storm, the insurers must rebuild. An
insurer may contract that, when a loss
occurs, he shall be liable on the theory
of indemnity against the existing loss,

or that he shall be held at his option "on
a substituted contract to rebuild. When
his election is made, he cannot withdraw
it. Each of two separate insurers
may make the same election, when the
substituted contract to rebuild will be
of the same separate nature as the
original contract to insure. One of two
separate insurers cannot, by his election, impose any new obligations upon
a co-insurer who makes no such election, and it may be doubted whether the
duty of the non-electing insurer to contribute fora loss within the policy is not
extinguished by the substitution of the
new agreement in the place of the one
on which he was, by an implication of
law, originally liable.
These considerations would lead to the
conclusion that it is injudicious for
insurers to avail themselves of the elective clause unless under special and
peculiar circumstances.
T. W. D.
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If one partner insures the property in his own name only, and there is no evidence
to show that the insurance was really intended for the benefit of the partnership, or that the premium was paid from the partnership funds and the transaction subsequently ratified by the other partner, the policy will be held to cover
his undivided interest, and no more.
The fact that the agent of the insurer was aware of the party's interest, and believed
and assured him that he had a right to insure the whole, cannot affect this
rule. One partner cannot, in his own name, and for his own benefit, insure the
interest of his copartner in the partnership stock, even though such may have
been the intention of both the insurer and insured.
I We are indebted for this case to the kindness of the reporter. T. M. Cooley,
Esq.
VOL. XI1-27
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A policy of insurance contained a clause that no suit or action should be brought
upon it unless within twelve months after the loss had occurred. It was held
that stivit a limitation must rest upon the tacit condition that the insurer
sh-Id b .coessible to the service of process, if not for the whole twelve months.
,t least A'r a sufficient time immediately preceding its close to enable the
intsured In ;.ommence suit against him by the service of process in the ordinary
'legal mode.
Where, therefore, process was issued thirteen days before the twelve months
expired, hut service could not be made on the insurer, it was held that the delay
was sdflut-iently excused, and a new suit might be brought after the expiration
of the twelve months.
Where a policy of insurance was conditioned that if gunpowder was kept for sale
or on storage, without written permission in the policy, the policy should
thereby be rendered void, it was held that if the agent at the time of taking the
insurance knew that gunpowder was kept, and was to be kept on the premises,
lhepolicy would not thereby be rendered void, whether permission was given in
Ibe policy or not.
Notice to the agent that gunpowder was kept, was notice to the insurer; and by
accepting thepremium and issuing the policy, the latter must be regarded as
having waived the condition.

Johnson

4. ffighy, for plaintiffs

in error.

0. Hawkins, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CHRISTIANOY, J.-This was a suit brought by Hall against the
company upon two policies of insurance against loss by fire; one'
upon a stock of goods in plaintiff's store in the village of Hamburg, Livingston county, Michigan, to the amount of $2000, dated
January 13th 1860, and the other for a like amount in the aggregate, upon plaintiff's dwelling-house, furniture, clothing, barn and
shed, hay and grain, and on his store-building there situate, the
amount insured upon each being specified, that upon the building
being $150. This policy is dated August 9th 1859.
The policies on their face are declared to be "made and accepted in reference to the conditions thereto annexed, which are
to be used and resorted to in order to explain the rights and
obligations of the parties in all cases not therein otherwise specially provided for." By the 8th condition annexed, it is declared,
among other things, that "the keeping of gunpowder and fire-

INSURANCE CO. vs. HALL.

crackers for sale, or on storage, upon or in the premises hereby
insured, or in any building containing property insured by or
under this policy, without written permission in the policy, shall
render it void and of no force or efrect." The 17th condition is
in the following words: "It is further hereby expressly provided
that no suit or action against said company for the recovery of any
claim under or by virtue of this policy shall be sustainable in any
court of law or chancery, unless such suit or action shall be commenced within the term of twelve months next after any loss or
damage shall occur ; and in case any suit or action shall be commenced against said company after the expiration of twelve
months next after such loss or damage shall have occurred, the
lapse of time shall be taken and deemed as conclusive evidence
against the validity of the claim so attempted to be enforced."
It was proved on the trial by the plaintiff below, who was sworn
as a witness in his own behalf, and the fact was undisputed, that
at the time of the application for insurance of the goods, and at
the date of the policy, one Helam Bennett was a partner of the
plaintiff in business, and as such was the owner of the undivided'
one-half of the goods insured, and continued to be such partner and
owner until the 14th day of March 1860, when the plaintiff 'bought
out his interest. 'There was evidence tending to show, as to the'
policy on the goods, that King, the agent of the company, camn
to the store and wanted to insure the goods ; that plaintiff signed
the application for the policy, which was mostly blank- when
signed; that some one came in, and King turned around and said
plaintiff could sign it, and he, King, could fill it out; that plaintiff
told King he usually sold gunpowder, and everything commonly
sold in a country store, and that he intended to do so. And, in
reference to the policy on the store, there was evidence that at
the time the insurance was taken, the keeping of gunpowder was
talked over with King, the agent, and he was told they had
powder in the store and was asked if it would make any difference
if powder was left for sale, to which he replied "No."
There was also evidence that plaintiff, at the time of the application for the insurance on the goods, to] d the agent he did not think
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he, plaintiff, had a right to insure Bennett's share, and that King
replied it would make no difference, that plaintiff had a right to
insure the whole.
The fire occurred on the 81st day of March 1860, by which the
store-building and the stock of goods were destroyed.
The Circuit Judge charged the jury that "if the agent, King,
at the time of the making of the policy on the goods, knew the
interest of the parties, that they were jointly owned by the plaintiff
and Bennett, and insured the whole stock, the policy would be
valid for the whole stock insured." To this charge exception was
taken, and this presents the first question we shall consider.
It is evident, from the language of the charge, that it was
intended to instruct the jury that if the agent at the time of making
the policy knew the interest of the parties, &c., the policy would
be valid for the wh6le amount of the interest of both partners, and
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover in this action the whole
amount of the loss of all the goods, though his interest at the time
of the insurance was but one-half; and though the insurance was
in his name alone, and his declaration averred that "at the time
of making said policy, and from thence until the loss, &c., he was
the owner of said property insured by said policy, and of the value
and to the amount by the said defendant insured thereon."
Without attempting to decide what might have been the rule of
law, had it appeared from the evidence that the insurance was
really intended for the benefit of the firm, the premium paid from
the partnership funds, and the transaction subsequently ratified
by the other partner, we think where, as in the present case, there
is no evidence of the kind, and its whole tendency is the other
way, the rule is well settled in referende to a fire policy like this.
that if one partner, or part owner of property held in common,
insure in his own name only, the policy will cover his undivided
interest and no more: Graves vs. Boston Marine Insurance Co.,
2 Cranch 419, 440; 8 Kent (5th ed.) 258; 2 Duer's Ins., §§ 24 &
20; Finney vs. Bedford Corn. ins. Co., 8 Met. 848; .Finney!vs.
Warren Ins. Co., 1 Met. 16; Pearson vs. Lord, 6 Mass. 81; 1
Phil. on Ins. 219, § 891 ; 1 Arnould on Ins. 146 and note. Tha
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rule may be otherwise where the partner making the insurance
has made advances to the firm which, by agreement, are to constitute a lien on the goods insured: 2 Duer on Ins. §§ 19 & 24; 8
La. R. 55T.
We do not see how the agent's knowledge of the interest of the
parties, nor his belief or assurance that Hall had the right to
insure the whole, can affect the question so long as the insurance
was not in fact made on the account and for the benefit of the
firm. One partner cannot, by reason alone of his interest in the
firm as such, insure in his own name, and for his own benefit, the
interest of his copartner in the partnership stock. And though
such may have been the intention, both of the assured and of the
company, on entering into the contract, the policy in legal effect,
can operate only as an indemnity against loss to the extent of the
plaintiff's undivided half of the goods. And if the policy, when
made, did not cover the other partner's undivided half, that portion
would not be brought within it by the plaintiff's subsequent
acquisition of the property from such other partner. The charge
was therefore erroneous, and as the verdict of the jury, in accordance with the charge, was for the whole amount of the goods, the
judgment must be reversed upon this ground. But as there is to
be a new trial, we think it proper to indicate our opinion upon the
two other questions raised in the case.
It was objected by the defendant below that the action was not
brought within the period of twelve months after the loss, according to the 17th condition attached to the policy. It appeais from
the bill of exception that a summons was issued in the cause
iarch 18th 1861-thirteen days before the expiration of the
twelve months-returnable on the second day of April 1861; that
on the 3d day of April 1861, the sheriff made a return upon said
summons that defendant could not be found in his bailiwick; that
on the next day another summons was issued with which defendant
,was served, nothing appearing on the summons showing it to be a
continuation of the first, except the word "alias" written by the
clerk upon the face of the seal.
We do not deem it necessary to discuss the question whether the
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second summons, as an alias, operated strictly as a continuance ot
the first, so as to save a right of action against a statute of limitations, which had run upon it in the mean time; nor do we deem it
necessary to determine the validity of this species of limitation
by contract. If valid at all, it was valid as a contraut, and not as
a statute. A limitation fixed by statute is arbitrary and peremptory, admitting of no excuse for delay beyond the period fixed,
unless such excuse be recognised by the statute itself. But a
limitation by contract, if valid, must, upon the principle governing
contracts, be more flexible in its nature, and liable to be defeated
or extended by any act of the defendant which has prevented the
plaintiff from bringing his action within the prescribed period. The
plaintiff had the whole of the twelve months in which to bring his
suit, and it was as competent for him to institute it on the last as
the first, or any intervening day. And the fundamental idea, the
tacit condition, upon which such a limitation must rest, and without which it could not be tolerated for a moment, is that the
defendant should be accessible to the service of process by which
suit may be commenced against him, if not for the whole period,
at least for a sufficient time immediately preceding its close, to
enable the plaintiff to commence suit against him by the service of
process in the ordinary legal mode, otherwise the defendant would
be enabled to take advantage of his own wrong, and by absenting
himself entirely to defeat the plaintiff's right of action.
The defendant, in the present case, was a foreign corporation,
doing insurance business in this state. By the Act of February
15th 1859, full provision is made for bringing the action within
the state; and the company, before doing any business in the
state, was required to file in the office of the secretary of state a
resolution consenting that service of process may be made upon
any agent of the company. Nothing is said in the case upon
what agent the service of the second summons was made, but it
must have beew made upon some agent of the company. It does
not appear whether there was an agent in the county of Jackson,
or in any other particular county. It appears that S. S. Brown
was the general agent of the company for the state, and, that
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Knight was also an agent; but neither their residence nor place
of business is stated. From anything which appears in the case
the plaintiff was as much at liberty to bring his action in Jackson
as in any other county, so far as the residence of an agent could
have any bearing, if, indeed, it could have any under the law; and
if an agent of the company resided in Jackson county, the action
was certainly being properly brought there.
All that was necessary for the plaintiff to do to excuse the
delay beyond the twelve months was to take the proper and usual
means for instituting his suit and getting service of process within
the limited period, which he did by issuing a summons thirteen
days before the expiration of that period, returnable two days
after it expired. The return shows that no service could be had
during that time. We can see no possible ground for imputing any
want of good faith to the plaintiff in his endeavor to get the process
served in time. Upon the facts stated in the case, therefore, it
appears to have been the fault of the defendant-the absence of
an agent-that the first summons was not served, and the action commenced within the twelve months; and this is sufficient to defeat
the limitation or extend it till the service was made under the
second summons, which was issued immediately on .the return of
the first.
As to the condition in reference to the keeping of gunpowder,
there was evidence from which the jury were authorized to find
that the agent knew it was kept at the time, and was to be kept
after the insurance, and that he assented to it and induced the
plaintiff to believe that it would make no difference.
Upon this point the court charged that "if plaintiff informed
the agent that he kept gunpowder in his store for sale, and the
agent intended to insure against keeping it, but neglected to
indorse the permission on the back of the policy, such neglect
would not make the policy invalid." The condition did not provide for any indorsement of this kind upon the policy, but the
keeping of gunpowder, was to render the policy void "without
written permission in the policy." To this exter., the charge was
inaccurate; yet we do not think it can be treate" as error of which
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the company can complain, since we think the plaintiff was
entitled to a still stronger charge in his favor. We think he
would have been entitled to a charge that, if the agent knew it
was kept and to be kept, the keeping it would not render the policy
void, whether the permission was indorsed or intended or neglected
to be indorsed or not.
But the counsel for the plaintiff in error insists that the printed
condition was notice to the assured of the agent's want of authority
to assent to the keeping of gunpowder, &c., and that this assent
could be given only by the company itself. This, -at first view,
would seem plausible and might be sound, but for another principle
which lies back of it and defeats its application. The principle
to which we allude is, that notice to the agent is notice to his
principal. The company must be regarded as knowing what he
knew. If he knew that powder was kept at the time of the insurance, or to be kept during its continuance, the company must be
regarded as having known it also. They had power to waive the
condition; and by taking the premium and issuing the policy with
such notice or knowledge, they must be regarded as having waived
the condition which prohibited its keeping. It would be a gross
fraud in the company to receive the -premium for issuing a policy
on which they did not intend to be liable, and which Ahey intended
to treat as void in case of loss : Bidwell vs. . Y.A s. Co., 24 N.
Y. 802 ; Frostvs. Saratoga Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Denio 154 ; Master'
vs. Madison county Mutual Ins. Co., 11 Barb. 624; Campbell vs.
Merchants' and Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co., 87N. H. 35; Marshall
vs. Columbian Ins. Co., 27 N. H. 157 ; ffartford Prot. Ins. Co.
vs. Harmar,2 Ohio (N. S.) 452; HowardFire Ins. Co. vs. Brunnet, 23 Pa. St. R. 50; Clark vs. Union*Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 40

N. H. 333. And see Angell on Ins. § 480.
We see no error in the record or proceedings in the court below,
except that in reference to the interest of the plaintiff at the time
of the insurance. For this error the judgment must be reversed,
with costs, and a new trial granted.
All the justices concurred.

BURTON vs. BURTON.

Court of Common Pleas of the aty of N'eTw York.
ELIZABETH

BURTON

VS.

CECILIA BURTON

AND

JOHN J.

CRANE,

Executors, &c., of WILLIAM E. BURTON, deceased.1
An alien woman married to an alien in a foreign country and-continuing to reside
there until her husband's death did not become a citizen of the United States by
the naturalization of her husband subsequent to their marriage.
She is, therefore, not entitled to dower under the laws of the state of New York.

Construction of the Act of Congress of 10th February 1855, sec. 2.
The plaintiff, by this action, seeks to have her dower admeasured
in the lands whereof William E. Burton died seised. She alleges
in her complaint that the plaintiff and William E. Burton were
married in England on the 10th April 1823, and to bring the case
within the Acts of Congress in relation to the naturalization of
aliens, she having, until after Burton's death, remained in England, embraces in her complaint the following peculiar allegation:"That she then was,; and ever since hath been and is a free
white woman."
She further alleges that William E. Burton died seised and
possessed of the pioperty described in the complaint, on the
10th day of February 1860, having devised the same to the defendants in fee.
The defendants, by their answer, denied the marriage, and as a
second defence set up the naturalization of Burton on the 8th day
of October 1840, in Pennsylvania; that the plaintiff was an alien,
having, ever since the pretended marriage, been, and still being,
a subject of Great Britain ; and, therefore, not entitled to dower
in the lands of the testator.
To this second defence the plaintiff demurred.
Oharles O'Connor and B.F. Dunning, for the plaintiff.-Burton, being a citizen of the United States on the 10th day of February 1855, the plaintiff, as his wife, by force of the Act of Congress
I We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of Edmund R. Robinson, Esq., of
New York.
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passed on that day, also became a citizen of the United States,
nothing in the Act of 1802 could be construed as requiring an
actual residence here; by construction of law the plaintiff's residence, at the time of the passage of the Act, was the same as that
of her husband. Under the act of the legislature of this state,
passed April 30th 1845, the plaintiff was entitled to recover her
(lower.
Edmund R. Rolinson, for defendants.-An alien is not entitled
to be endowed of lands of her husband, whether he was a citizen
or not. The plaintiff does not come within the Act of Congress
of 1855, because, until after the death of Burton, she never resided
or came within the United States.
The opinion of the court was delivered, March 17th 1864, by
BRADY, J.-In this case a question is presented, for the first
time, which involves a construction of the 2d section of the Act
of Congress, passed on the 10th February 1855, which is as

follows :-"Any woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the
United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen of the
United States :" (10 Statutes at Large, p. 604, § 2; Brightly's
Digest, p. 132, § 2.)
The plaintiff was the wife of William E. Burton, now deceased.
They were both born in Great Britain. After their marriage, Mr.
Burton came to this country and continued to be a resident thereof
until his death. He was duly naturalized in the year 1840. The
plaintiff continued to be a resident of her native land until after
the death of her husband, when she came to this country, and in
this action, under and by virtue of the Act of Congress referred to,
claims a right of dower in the lands of which he died seised. The
difficulties which present themselves in this case arise from the
ambiguity of the section which has been recited. What is meant
by the words "any person, who might lawfully be naturalized
under the existing laws, married to a citizen of the United States" ?
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The rest of the section is free from obscurity. The language
employed by the lawgivers would seem to extend the rights of
citizenship to every woman married to a citizen of the United
States, whether such marriage took place before or after the
husband became a citizen, and whether the wife was or was not a
resident of this country, either at the time of the marriage or
subsequently.
Did the Congress of the United States, enacting this law, intend
that it should have such an effect ? We must, as suggested by
Chief Justice TANEY, gather their intention from the language
used, comparing it, where ambiguity exists, with the laws upon
the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history
of the times in which it was passed; Aldridge vs. Williams, 3 How.
U. S. Rep. 24; and adopting that suggestion as a guide, a conclusion may be drawn, which will remove the doubts and reveal
the design of the act under consideration. The act itself was
framed (see section first) in reference to the issue of citizens of
this country born abroad. Necessity for legislation -on that
subject undoubtedly provoked it. A very able review by Mr.
Horace Binney of the acts of Congress in force on that subject
and of the various attempts to remedy the existing legal defects
will be found in 2 American Law Register 193, and I entertain the
belief that the review mentioned contributed much to the enactment of the law. It will not be necessary for the determination
of the question involved in this case, however, to consider in detail
the whole scope of ligislation upon the subject of the citizenship
of children born abroad whose parents were or whose father was 0,
citizen of the United States, but to refer to it as incidental to the
question on hand, the two subjects embraced in the Act of 1855
being kifidred to and growing out of each other. It will be sufficient, therefore, in relation to the subject embraced in the -first
section of the Act of 1855 to say that under the then existing
laws the child of a citizen of the United States born abroad was
an alien, and that even under the Act of Congress passed in 1802
(Brightly's Digest, p. 85), the child of an alien mother born
abroad was an alien although the father was in fact a citizen.
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Some attempts were made in Congress to remedy this, and bills
were introduced for that purpose. One reported by Mr. Wall in
1841, another introduced by Mr. Webster in 1848, and still another
by Mr. Bradbury in 1852. None of these bills were passed, however-they were unlike in phraseology or dissimilar in scope.
The bill reported by Mr. Wall contained no express provision in
reference to women. The bill of Mr. Webster provided that the
children of citizens of the United States born out of the limits of
the United States should be considered as citizens of the United
States, and also by the second section, "that every woman married,
or who should be married to a citizen of the United States, and
should continue to reside therein, should be deemed and taken to
be a citizen of the United States." The bill introduced by Mr.
Bradbury was precisely the same as Mr. Webster's; but the
Judiciary Committee recommended that the second section should
be stricken out. (Review of Mr. Binney, eupra; see, also, Conressional Globe, and Appendix, Second Session, Twenty-sixth
Congress, pp. 181-212; Congressional Globe, First Session, Thirtieth Congress, p. 834-Mr. Webster's remarks, and p. 844, his
bill; Congressional Globe, Part Second, Twenty-fourth Volume,
First Session, Thirty-second Congress, pp. 991-1352.) It will
thus be seen that legislation in Congress, so far as it extended to
alien wives prior to the year 1855, contemplated a continued
residence by them in this country, which'was the effect of the provision in Mr. Webster's bill, and, as we have seen, the Judiciary
Committee, at a subsequent period, recommended that even the
grant of that privilege should be discountenanced. The conditional qualification of continued residence by the wife may. have
been regarded as objectionable, because. it was not imposed upon
the husband, and his civil condition might continue, while hers
would change. But whether that was so or not, no substitute was
suggested for that section'by the committee. The assault upon it
was sweeping. The Act of 1855, therefore, as we glean from tnis
previous legislation, though unfinished, the history of the legisla.
tave object to be attained by it, and as 'well the general considera.
tions which influenced nations in framing naturalization laws, was
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designed, certainly, for the benefit of an alien white woman,
whether resident or not, married to a person who was at the time
bf the marriage a citizen of the United States, thus securing, by
the same law, the rights of citizenship to the children of American
citizens born abroad, and to such alien wife all legal rights of
citizenship, which otherwise, and by reason of her alienism, she
might not possess. (See opinion of Judge ]INGRAHAM in case of
Greer vs. Sankaton, decided in the Supreme Court, First District,
adopting a like construction upon similar phraseology in a kindred
case.)
This was, in my judgment, the primary object of the act, if it be
not the full scope of its intent. It was a legislative measure
passed in reference to citizens of the United States, and, bearing
upon such marital relations with alien women as they might
establish. Construed with liberality, however, it might be held,
also, to extend to an alien woman resident in this country, though
married abroad to an alien, and who came, to this country with him
or followed him here, or in that way, or in one of these ways,
identified herself with the country of his adoption. Such a construction would produce an affect analogous to that of the statute
which confers citizenship upon the alien minor children, dwelling
in the United States, of a person who becomes a citizen. (Act,
Brightly's Digest, p. 85, § 3.
In this case, the plaintiff has neither sought to derive the benefit
of her husband's naturalization by coming with or following him
nere, nor entitled herself to the benefit of a liberal construction in
ner favor of the act, as suggested, by a residence in this country of
any duration prior to her husband's death. Her rights, therefore,
as a citizen, depend entirely upon the construction of the section
of the statute under consideration, and I am of the opinion that she
has no claim upon her husband's estate thereunder. He was .not,
when he married her, a citizen of the United States, and she was
never a resident thereof during his life. On the contrary, she
was and continued to be both alien and stranger.
The plaintiff being an alien, and having married an alien, and
not having resided in this countryprior to her husband's death,

